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In October 2009, the European Council of heads of state and gov-
ernment agreed to the long-term political objective of reducing the 
EU’s emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) by between 80 and 
95 per cent by 2050, compared to 1990 levels (European Coun-
cil, 2009). Such an objective is in line with the suggestions of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as the effort required 
by developed countries to avoid catastrophic climate change (see 
IPCC, 2013). This objective effectively requires a dramatic transi-
tion in the EU’s energy sector – away from fossil fuels and towards 
low-carbon or zero-GHG emitting energy sources (European Com-
mission, 2011). 
In this paper, I highlight three main conclusions from my PhD re-
search project that examined the extent to which the 2050 climate 
policy objective is integrated into EU energy policy (entitled “Climate 
policy integration into EU energy policy”). EU policymakers may wish 
to consider the ramifications of these conclusions in the elaboration 
of legislation on the climate and energy policy framework to 2030, 
and beyond.
The three main conclusions are as follows:
1. The EU engages in continuous “catch-up governance”, as the low 
ambition and poor implementation of past policy measures mean 
that future measures have less time in which to achieve climate 
goals. 
2. EU policymakers cannot rely on external stakeholders to push for 
more policy ambition, especially when internal EU legislators em-
phasise other priorities and consider these priorities in opposition 
to climate policy goals.
3. Long-term policy planning is insufficiently part of day-to-day 
policymaking and policy analysis, and the functional interrelations 
between energy policy and long-term climate policy objectives are 
not always adequately recognised.
The next sections discuss the research project, its results and con-
clusions in more detail. I close the paper by highlighting some con-
crete actions that policymakers may need to take to develop coher-
ent policies and to achieve long-term climate policy goals.
With discussions on-going in the EU on the climate and energy policy framework to 
2030, it is timely to assess the reality of climate 
policy integration into EU energy policy. Such an 
analysis can lead to lessons for the legislative 
process for the 2030 package, and even for 
policies in other sectors and beyond 2030. Climate 
change is a complex, crosscutting, long-term 
and global problem. Policymakers acknowledge 
that integrating climate policy objectives into 
the elaboration and agreement of measures in 
other sectors represents one method for striving 
towards coherent policies that respond adequately 
to the climate change problem. This policy brief 
presents the results and policy recommendations 
from the project “climate policy integration into 
EU energy policy”. 
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Research project and results
In the project “climate policy integration into EU energy policy”, 
I examined the extent of climate policy integration (CPI) in the 
process and output of three EU energy policies over the course of 
2000 to 2010. The extent of CPI found was then evaluated against 
a number of explanatory variables. The project followed a qualita-
tive comparative case-study research design, comparing:
1. EU renewable energy policy, RE (renewable energy sources of 
electricity Directive 2001/77/EC and renewable energy Directive 
2009/28/EC); 
2. EU energy performance of buildings policy, EPB (Directive 
2002/91/EC and its 2010 recast, Directive 2010/31/EC). 
3. EU policies in support of infrastructure to import natural 
gas (trans-European networks for energy, TEN-E, Decisions 
1229/2003 and 1364/2006, and the European Energy Pro-
gramme for Recovery, EEPR, Regulation No 663/2009). 
To measure the extent of CPI in each of these policies I assessed 
the extent to which they helped achieve the desired reduction in 
GHG emissions by between 80 and 95 per cent by 2050. In each 
of the three cases, the level of CPI was found to be insufficient to 
achieve decarbonisation by 2050, although results varied. While 
renewable energy policy proved a best case (with low to medium 
levels of CPI for the policy output of the 2009 Directive), policy 
on natural gas infrastructure proved the worst case, with no evi-
dence of CPI. 
Additionally, looking into the processes leading to the adoption 
of each of these policy measures provided further clues about 
the strength of CPI. While pro-climate stakeholders may have 
had a relatively strong voice in the determination of EU renew-
able energy policy, with backing from EU legislators, these voices 
were not present in the elaboration of policy on natural gas in-
frastructure support. Furthermore, where internal EU legislators 
(e.g. member states in the Council) did not share the same pro-
climate views, CPI remained weak due to other priorities. This is 
the case in energy performance of buildings policy (see Table 1). 
CASE CPI Process CPI Output
2001 RES-E Low to medium Low
2009 RE Medium to high Low (to medium)
2002 EPBD Low to medium Low
2010 EPBD Low to medium Low
2003, 2006 TEN-E None/very low None/very low
2009 EEPR None/very low None/very low
Table 1: The extent of CPI in the cases.
In summary, it can be clearly stated that, given the long-term 
policy perspective of achieving climate policy goals to 2050, the 
level of CPI in the three cases is insufficient. Neither did the lev-
els of CPI evolve much over the course of the first decade of 
the 2000s (even though regulations did get more stringent, see 
below). 
Why is CPI insufficient?
To identify explanations for these results, it is useful to refer to 
the growing literature on environmental and climate policy inte-
gration in general (Adelle & Russel, 2013; Dupont & Oberthür, 
2012; Lafferty & Hovden, 2003), and to literature on the Euro-
pean integration process (Wiener, 2009). A number of potentially 
important explanatory variables can thus be identified, includ-
ing: 
• The extent of political commitment to climate change and cli- 
   mate policy integration; 
• The nature of the functional interrelations between climate    
   policy and the second policy objective; 
• The institutional set-up for decision-making and the broader      
   context within which policy is made; 
• And the policy process itself as an explanation for the level of  
   CPI in the policy output. 
Applying the explanatory framework to the cases revealed the 
relative importance of the variables for understanding the extent 
of CPI in the policy process and the policy output. 
First, the recognition by policymakers of the nature of the func-
tional interrelations between the energy policy being developed 
and climate policy objectives represented a crucial first-order 
variable for any ensuing evidence of CPI. Where the nature of 
functional interrelations between policy objectives was found to 
be less obvious (or direct) and conflictual, it proved more chal-
lenging to find evidence of CPI later – due partly to the fact that 
in such circumstances, policymakers were less likely to recog-
nise that functional interrelations existed at all. In the case of 
policy to support natural gas import infrastructure, for example, 
policymakers hardly recognised the links to long-term climate 
policy objectives. When climate change was part of the discus-
sion in this case, it was only with a short-term view of promoting 
gas as an alternative to coal. Taking the long-term perspective to 
2050 clearly shows that there is more than enough natural gas 
infrastructure to cover all EU natural gas consumption into the 
future (see also IES Policy Brief No. 1/2012). 
Second, overarching political commitment by the EU to combat-
ing climate change was insufficient to push increases in levels of 
CPI in policy processes and outputs. It becomes clear that a sec-
ond element of political commitment is required to advance CPI: 
namely, political commitment to pushing CPI in particular. Lit-
erature on environmental policy integration has long highlighted 
the importance of political commitment to environmental aims. 
Over the course of 2000 to 2010, while the overarching political 
commitment to combating climate change in the EU increased 
from medium to high levels, only in the renewable energy case 
did the levels of political commitment to CPI increase – albeit in-
crementally – over the same time period. By itself, political com-
mitment both to combating climate change in general and to 
promoting CPI, cannot explain the levels of CPI found in the case 
studies, but must be combined with other explanatory variables.
 
Third, the role of pro-climate and environmental policymakers 
and stakeholders in the policy process, as well as elements of 
the decision-making process and the broader context can help 
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add nuance to the understanding of why such levels of CPI were 
found. In the energy performance of buildings case, for example, 
it was in later years that environmental stakeholders became in-
terested in promoting higher levels of energy efficiency in build-
ings. However, member states did not necessarily see the clear 
benefit of EU-level policy in this field and rather watered-down 
provisions during the policy process. In later developments of 
the policy across all three cases, the financial and economic cri-
ses may have played a role in the final results. In the 2009 EEPR, 
for example, providing large sums of financial support for gas 
infrastructure projects was considered necessary considering 
the lower levels of private investment. 
What can be learned?
As mentioned above, there are three broad conclusions that can 
be drawn from this research.
1. The EU engages in continuous “catch-up governance”. EU poli-
cy measures seem to come too late with too little ambition. Each 
subsequent policy measure follows the same pattern, although 
it may be more stringent. As the timeframe to 2050 shortens, 
so the policy ambition must move forward in leaps and bounds. 
In the cases examined here, this leap in policy ambition did not 
occur. In the energy performance of buildings case, the 2010 
Directive certainly improved the legislative framework in place: 
more stringent criteria were agreed for the energy performance 
of buildings, with timetables for ensuring all new buildings re-
sult in “nearly-zero” GHG emissions. However, the 2010 Directive 
came eight years after the weak and poorly implemented 2002 
Directive. Although the provisions may be more stringent, the 
timeframe to achieve the climate policy objectives (to 2050) is 
shortened, rendering even the more stringent measures insuf-
ficiently ambitious.
2. EU policymakers cannot rely on external stakeholders to push 
climate policy objectives onto the agenda in all policy processes. 
In the energy performance of buildings case, there was very lit-
tle climate stakeholder involvement in the policy process in the 
early 2000s. This may simply be because of a lack of resources 
available to such stakeholders and their own priorities. In the 
case of natural gas infrastructure policies, climate stakeholders 
were effectively absent from policymaking. This is not necessar-
ily a conscious omission, either by EU policymakers or by the 
stakeholders themselves, but rather a product of circumstances. 
In the case of natural gas, many climate stakeholders may see 
the benefit of a short-term move to natural gas and away from 
coal. And many policymakers may not see the need to include 
such stakeholders in the policy process, especially when the 
functional interrelations with climate policy objectives are not 
explicitly recognised. 
3. Long-term visions and objectives are often missing from day-
to-day policymaking in the EU. Policymaking tends to follow a 
short or medium-term logic, with policy ambitions proving in-
sufficient for the long-term perspective. The renewable energy 
case demonstrates policy measures that seem ambitious in the 
short-term (with the 20 per cent target for 2020), but that are 
not ambitious enough in the long-term. By agreeing policy meas-
ures to 2020 that are insufficiently ambitious, more demand-
ing later policies will be needed to ensure the 2050 objective is 
achieved – this puts off the bulk of the work until the future. In 
the natural gas infrastructure case, the short and medium-term 
vision is rather absurd, given the long life cycle of most large in-
frastructure projects (50 or 60 years). Natural gas infrastructure 
built before 2020 will still have the capacity to operate in 2050, 
and beyond. Taking a short-term view that natural gas may help 
move away from coal in the years leading to 2020 seems no 
justification for supporting infrastructure that would not be re-
quired for most of its operational lifetime. The clear risk is a 
“lock-in” to fossil fuels in the EU’s energy system. 
What can policymakers and politicians do?
When it comes to long-term policy planning, it is important not 
only to set ambitious long-term policy objectives, but also to 
decide how to get there. With the discussions around the 2030 
climate and energy policy framework, the EU seems on the right 
track. However, as shown above, policymakers need to attempt 
to break the pattern of “catch-up governance” and avoid putting 
off too much to tomorrow what needs to be achieved today. The 
long-term horizon to 2050 is often overshadowed by short-term 
concerns, such as costs. Putting the 2050 objective at the centre 
of discussions should help policymakers overcome such short-
term concerns, by highlighting the consequences of inaction and 
the opportunities (for employment, health, environment, the 
economy, the EU’s political standing) of strong and ambitious 
action on climate change. European Commission officials, in par-
ticular, may have more opportunities to underline this focus, as 
they are less reliant on elections than MEPs or government rep-
resentatives in the Council. 
Policymakers should not be naïve, however, in thinking that fo-
cusing on the long-term policy horizon will mean policymaking 
will proceed smoothly. With a long-term policy vision, policy 
contradictions may become evident, along with the policy coher-
ences that may also surface. In cases of policy contradictions 
(such as with policies supporting new natural gas infrastructure 
counter to objectives to reduce GHG emissions by 2050), deci-
sions on policy priorities will need to be made. Guidance on the 
overarching priorities of the EU may require a high-level political 
decision, with agreement across governments and party groups 
about the long-term policy priorities for the EU. With such guid-
ance, policymakers can then make the difficult trade-offs that 
may be required in sector policies. Agreeing on such priorities 
will certainly prove challenging, especially in a context of short-
term political cycles and overriding concern about the economic 
context. However, by promoting discussion on prioritising ob-
jectives, the EU’s decision makers may find that over time they 
come eventually to a common vision, not only for climate and 
energy policy, but also for the EU as a whole.  
Furthermore, a concrete, practical step that can be implemented 
in EU policymaking is to ensure that the functional interrelations 
between long-term climate policy objectives and the policy meas-
ure being developed are clearly recognised by policymakers. An 
impact assessment procedure that assesses a particular policy’s 
impact on the achievement of the 2050 climate policy objective 
may represent a first step in ensuring policymakers are aware of 
the functional interrelations. Making such an assessment obliga-
tory for all policy developments would prove invaluable, as in 
certain cases the functional interrelations may not be immedi-
ately obvious. Combined with a political objective that prioritises 
the 2050 climate objective, abandoning policy measures that 
contradict this goal would become a valid way forward. Addition-
ally, such an impact assessment should and could be referred to 
throughout a policy process to ensure that policy discussions do 
not deviate from a long-term vision during the process. 
Finally, other procedures or guidelines may be required to help 
advance CPI in the EU. For instance, in cases of recognised pol-
icy contradictions, policymakers may require training on the 
climate change issue (even in sectors that seem unrelated to 
climate change) to raise their awareness about the importance 
of enhancing policy synergies. Supporting formal and informal 
interaction among policymakers may help each understand the 
working portfolio of the other and how climate change interacts 
with their policy domain. These are just two examples of new 
procedural measures that may be required for furthering CPI, 
and thus helping ensure the EU achieves its 2050 objective. 
In conclusion, with the EU discussing the framework for climate 
and energy policy to 2030, it is crucial to consider the long-term 
context of the 2050 decarbonisation goal. Without enhanced 
efforts at improving CPI, without clear and explicit recognition 
of functional interrelations with long-term climate objectives, 
the EU is at risk of continuing on a path of insufficient CPI and 
“catch-up governance” – a path that is unlikely to lead to the 
achievement of the 2050 objective. Policymakers and politicians 
would do well to learn some lessons from the efforts of the first 
decade of the 2000s and the insufficient levels of CPI evident in 
energy policy at that time.
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